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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the clinical trial strategies and performance of large, established ("mature")
biopharmaceutical firms to those of smaller ("early stage") firms that have not yet successfully
developed a drug. We study a sample of 235 cancer drug candidates that entered clinical trials during
the period 1990-2002 and were sponsored by public firms. Early stage firms are more likely than
mature firms to advance drug candidates from Phase I to Phase II clinical trials. However, early stage
firms have much less promising clinical results in their Phase II trials and their Phase II drug
candidates are also less likely to advance to Phase III and to receive Food and Drug Administration
approval. This pattern is more pronounced for early stage firms with large cash reserves. The
evidence points to an agency problem between shareholders and managers of single-product early
stage firms who are reluctant to abandon development of their only viable drug candidates. By
contrast, the managers of mature firms with multiple products in development are more willing to
drop unpromising drug candidates. The findings appear to be consistent with the benefits of internal
capital markets identified by Stein (1997).
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  How does organizational scope affect investment behavior and performance?  We 
study this question by examining the drug development behavior and performance of 
biopharmaceutical firms. We believe that drug development is an ideal setting in which to 
address this question for three reasons.  First, there is considerable heterogeneity in how 
biopharmaceutical firms are organized.  Some are well-established firms with many drugs 
on the market and a large portfolio of drug candidates at various stages of development.  
Others are early stage firms with no products yet on the market and no more than one or 
two drugs in development.  Second, there is a wealth of detailed, publicly available 
information on the project-level investments of biopharmaceutical firms, namely the 
clinical trials required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine the 
safety and efficacy of drug candidates.  Finally, these investments have measurable 
outcomes.  Thus, one can compare, at a very fine-grained level, the investment behavior 
and performance of firms that differ in their organizational scope.    
  Why might we expect the scope of an organization to affect its investment 
behavior and performance?  Our hypothesis is a variant of Stein (1997) who identifies the 
conditions under which an internal capital market that allocates funds across n competing 
projects is preferable to an external capital market that funds n single-project firms.  In 
his framework, the problem with single-project firms is that when they have poor 
investment opportunities they may still invest because their managers will be reluctant to 
return funds to shareholders and lose the private benefits that come from running firms 
and projects.  This is less of a problem in an internal capital market because managers   2 
have a broader range of projects in which to invest, allowing them to get both private 
benefits and better projects. 
   This basic logic fits closely with the biopharmaceutical industry.  The biggest 
investments in this industry are the clinical trials that are required for a drug to be 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
1  A particular drug candidate 
must go through three phases of clinical trials on human subjects: small Phase I trials 
designed in most cases to test a drug’s safety; larger Phase II trials to test both its safety 
and efficacy; and finally very large Phase III trials with as many as a several thousand 
subjects. At each point along the way, a company must decide based on scientific, 
clinical, and financial information whether to continue to the next, more expensive phase 
of clinical trials.  
  We argue that the managers of early-stage biopharmaceutical firms --- those with 
only one or two drugs in development --- are excessively reluctant to end clinical trials 
after Phase I.  Pulling the plug then would mean either that the firm would have to be 
liquidated or that research on a new drug would have to be started. If the firm is 
liquidated, the managers would lose the private benefits that come from running the 
company.  These private benefits are best thought of as firm-specific human capital.  If 
the firm is not liquidated, but instead a new research program is begun to replace the 
failed one, the managers might also lose private benefits to the extent that their human 
capital is tied to the abandoned research program.  Therefore, we argue that managers of 
early-stage firms would be willing to take marginally uneconomic projects forward from 
Phase I to Phase II.   
                                                 
1The most recent estimate of the cost of getting a single drug approved is $802 million (deflated to 2000).  
This estimate factors in the expected costs associated with failed attempts to develop a drug.       3 
  This sort of problem is less severe in mature biopharmaceutical firms with 
numerous drug candidates in pre-clinical and clinical testing.  The managers who make 
the decision to move a Phase I trial into Phase II choose among a portfolio of drug 
candidates. While they may benefit from moving drugs along in the pipeline, it is 
unlikely that they benefit disproportionately from any particular drug being advanced.  
Thus, we would expect them to choose to advance drugs with the highest value to the 
company.  This is the essence of Stein’s (1997) argument on the value of internal capital 
markets. 
  This perspective suggests that: (1) early-stage firms will be more aggressive in 
taking trials from Phase I to Phase II; (2) early-stage firms will be more likely to have 
unpromising clinical results at Phase II; and (3) early stage firms are less likely to take a 
trial forward from Phase II to Phase III.  
  Financial constraints could mitigate the tendency of early stage firms to be overly 
aggressive in moving forward from Phase I to Phase II.  To the extent that firms lack the 
cash reserves to fund Phase II trials, we would expect them to be less prone to move 
forward and, conditional on moving forward, to have better clinical results. These low 
cash, early-stage firms would therefore also be more likely to move forward from Phase 
II trials to Phase III.   
  Our empirical results are in line with these predictions. The sample we analyze 
consists of 235 Phase I trials for drugs to treat cancer.  We find that early-stage firms are 
more prone than mature firms to advance into Phase II trials within two years of initiating 
their Phase I trial (61.4% vs. 45.3%). Moreover, if an early stage firm advances to Phase 
II, the clinical results of the Phase II trial are worse. In Phase II trials conducted by early   4 
stage firms, the percentage of patients exhibiting some shrinkage of their tumors --- a key 
marker of success of a Phase II trial --- is less than half that of trials conducted by mature 
firms (6% vs. 12%).  Given the poor performance of Phase II trials sponsored by early 
stage firms, it is not surprising that these firms are also much less likely than mature 
firms to move into Phase III trials within a three-year period (13.6% vs. 34.9%).  This 
difference is driven to a very large extent by early stage firms with large cash reserves.  
These firms bring 75.6% of their Phase I trials into Phase II, and have an even lower 
tumor response rate in Phase II (4% vs. 12% for mature firms).  Only 3.2% of the Phase 
II drug candidates of high-cash early stage firms proceed to Phase III (i.e. once in 31 
Phase II trials).  Low-cash, early stage firms are only slightly more prone than mature 
firms to go from Phase I to Phase II, have somewhat worse clinical results in Phase II 
trials, and are less likely to proceed to Phase III.   
These results point to agency problems in external capital markets that lead to 
over-investment.  They suggest that internal capital markets play a role in mitigating 
these over-investment problems (Stein, 1997) and that large cash reserves exacerbate the 
extent of over-investment (Jensen, 1986).  
Our findings connect in important ways to three literatures.  The first is the 
literature on the costs and benefits of internal capital markets.  Much of this literature 
suggests that internal capital markets lead to investment inefficiencies due to cross-
subsidization of divisions in low-growth industries by those in high growth industries 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, Scharfstein, 1998, Shin and Stulz, 1998 and Rajan, Servaes 
and Zingales, 2000). Another line of the empirical literature argues that internal capital   5 
markets enable firms to redeploy capital from unprofitable sectors to more profitable ones 
(Khanna and Tice, 2001, and Maksimovic and Phillips 2002).   
This paper is also related to the literature on free cash flow and investment 
(Jensen, 1986) claiming that firms with large cash flows, cash reserves, or debt capacity, 
tend to over-invest.  There are many papers that try to test this hypothesis, but the ones 
closest to ours are those that look at investments at the project level.  Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling (1991) find that the stock price reaction to the announcement of an acquisition 
is smaller when bidding firms have excess cash flow.  More recently, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) find that firms with excess cash flow tend to bid more for oil and 
gas leases and that these leases are, on average, less productive.   
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the determinants of success in drug 
development.  The closest link is to Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira (2003) who estimate 
the effect of experience on the probability that firms move forward in the clinical trials 
process.  They find that small firms are slightly more likely than large firms to advance 
from Phase I to Phase II, and that the effect is reversed for Phase II to Phase III 
transitions.   They interpret these findings as evidence that there is learning-by-doing in 
the management of clinical trials; however, our findings suggest that the higher Phase II 
success rates of large firms may not be the result of learning-by-doing but rather may be 
the result of agency problems at small firms that lead them to bring poor drug candidates 
into Phase II trials.
2   
                                                 
2 Cockburn and Henderson (2001) examine the determinants of success at the level of a research program 
(e.g. cardiac and circulatory) rather than at the level of a particular drug candidate. They find that firms 
with a broader range of research program are more likely to end up with FDA-approved drugs.   Given the 
different unit of analysis it is difficult to link their results to ours. 
   6 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section outlines a simple framework 
to structure our thinking about the agency problems that arise in biopharmaceutical firms.  
Section 3 outlines the construction of the database and Section 4 presents the results.  
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK 
  This section outlines a very simple framework for comparing the investment 
behavior of early-stage biopharmaceutical firms to that of mature biopharmaceutical 
firms. We model the decision of whether to advance from a Phase I clinical trial, the 
earliest and least expensive phase of clinical development, to a Phase II clinical trial. 
Based on the results of the Phase I trial, the manager assesses the probability that a Phase 
II trial will be “successful,” and that he would want to go forward to Phase III. 
“Successful” is in quotation marks because a clinical trial does not really “succeed” or 
“fail.” Rather, the results are often difficult to interpret, with reasonable people differing 
on the interpretations.  For simplicity, however, we suppose that if the trial is successful, 
further development of the drug has an expected discounted payoff of X > 0.  If the trial 
is unsuccessful the expected payoff is zero.  Let p2 be the probability of success.  Let I2 
be the cost of conducting a Phase II trial. Finally, suppose that A is the liquidation value 
of the compound if it does not advance to Phase II.   Then, the first-best decision rule is 
to go forward to Phase II provided: 
(1)     p2X - I2  ³ A. 
   7 
        Would an early stage firm use this decision rule? We argue that the answer is no 
because the managers (or founders) of early stage firms derive private benefits, b, from 
their projects.  In this case, the condition would be 
(2)     p2X - I2 + b ³ A. 
As a result, an early stage firm would be more prone to advance to Phase II than would 
be implied by the first-best condition (1). 
What are the managers’ private benefits in the context of drug development?  One 
possibility is that managers have project-specific human capital that they would lose if 
they abandon the project and try to develop another drug.  A second possibility is that 
managers have firm-specific human capital that they would lose if they abandon the 
project and the firm is liquidated.  Finally, one can interpret b as a measure of managerial 
over-optimism about the expected payoffs from the project.   
Like the managers of early stage firms, the managers of drug development 
projects in mature firms are also likely to derive private benefits from drug development.  
However, unlike early stage firms, the decision of whether to advance to Phase II is not 
made by these managers, but rather higher-level managers who choose among a portfolio 
of drug candidates.  These managers might derive private benefits from drug 
development, but there is no reason to believe that they derive benefits from one 
particular project over another.  Thus, if they cannot choose to undertake all of the 
projects, they will choose those with the highest expected value exclusive of private 
benefits.  This is essentially Stein’s (1997) argument for the efficiency of internal capital 
markets.     8 
  This simple framework generates two empirical predictions.  From a comparison 
of (1) and (2) we get the first prediction.   
Prediction 1: Early stage firms will be more likely to advance from Phase I trials 
to Phase II trials. 
  Holding X and I2 fixed, a comparison of (1) and (2) implies that early stage firms 
that go ahead to Phase II, will do so, on average, at lower levels of p2.  This generates a 
second prediction: 
Prediction 2:  Early stage firms will be more likely to fail in Phase II clinical 
trials.  
There are additional predictions if financial constraints are introduced into the 
model. These are most relevant for early stage firms, as mature firms have large cash 
flows from existing drugs on the market.  If early stage firms do not have the financial 
resources to fund a Phase II trial, they will have to finance the trial by raising external 
capital.  If the project has negative net present value this will be difficult or impossible to 
do.  If the firm has cash, C, it will have to raise I2 – C, and will only be able to raise 
outside capital if  p2X - I2 > -C.   If C is small, the firm will not be able to fund projects 
with significant negative net present value. Thus, we have our third and fourth 
predictions. 
Prediction 3: Early stage firms with low cash reserves will be less likely to 
advance from Phase I to Phase II trials than early stage firms with high cash reserves.   
Prediction 4: Early stage firms with low cash reserves will be more likely to 
succeed in Phase II  trials.   
      9 
3. DATA 
In order for a drug to be marketed, the FDA requires that it go through a series of 
clinical trials on human subjects.  Phase I trials --- the earliest and smallest of the clinical 
trials --- are typically conducted on fewer than 30 patients, are designed to determine a 
drug’s safety.  For most diseases, these trials are performed using healthy subjects, 
although cancer drug trials, the focus of our study, are conducted on subjects with the 
disease.  DiMasi et. al. (2003), using a sample of 68 drug candidates in clinical trials at 
large pharmaceutical firms  between 1983 and 1994, estimate that the mean (median) out-
of-pocket cost of a Phase I trial was $15.2 million ($13.9 million) deflated to 2000. 
 Phase II trials are larger and more costly than Phase I trials.  They include as 
many as a few hundred subjects, use patients with the disease, and are designed to test 
both safety and efficacy.  The mean (median) cost of a Phase II trial in the DiMasi et. al. 
sample was $23.5 million ($17.0 million). 
Finally, Phase III trials are typically very large studies, including possibly 
thousands of subjects. The mean (median) cost of a Phase III trial in the DiMasi sample 
was $86.3 million ($62.0 million).  After completing these trials, a drug sponsor can seek 
regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration by filing a New Drug 
Application (NDA)
3.   
The analysis focuses on clinical trials for the treatment of cancer.  There are a few 
reasons why we restrict attention to cancer.  First, one can only make meaningful 
comparisons of clinical outcomes within a disease class.  The outcome of a clinical trial 
for lung cancer (e.g. tumor response) cannot easily be compared to the outcome of a 
                                                 
3 For certain classes of drugs, a drug’s sponsor will file a Biological License Application, which is also 
evaluated by the FDA.    10 
clinical trial for hypertension (e.g. reduction in blood pressure). Second, in the case of 
cancer, there are relatively straightforward, measurable clinical outcomes such as tumor 
response.  Third, as noted above, Phase I cancer trials include sick patients so that, in 
principle, efficacy can be measured at an early stage. We conjectured that Phase I cancer 
trials might result in more useful clinical information that could inform a decision to 
move to Phase II.  (As we will soon see, this did not turn out to be the case.) Finally, 
cancer is the disease class with the largest number of clinical trials during the last decade.          
 
3.1 Sample Construction 
The starting point for the construction of our sample is a database we assembled 
in conjunction with Thomas Roberts, M.D.  The database includes the Phase I clinical 
oncology trials described in annual volumes of Papers/Proceedings of the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology from 1990-2002. Each year, the American Society of 
Clinical Oncology (ASCO) has an annual meeting for its members, mainly medical 
clinicians and researchers.  Coinciding with the meeting, ASCO publishes (in hard copy 
and now on-line) a compilation of abstracts describing research in the field.  It is standard 
for oncology research groups to submit abstracts describing their research. These 
abstracts are not peer-reviewed, and all submitted abstracts are published.   
Phase I trials are identified by searching all the abstracts that include in their title 
or in the abstract itself the words “Phase I”, “Phase I/II”, “dose-finding”, “new”, and 
“novel”. From this list, only the ones that indeed describe a Phase I clinical trial are kept. 
Abstracts that describe one or more of the following are excluded:  combination trials 
(i.e. trials using multiple drug compounds); agents targeting pediatric cancers; agents that   11 
were previously reviewed by the FDA; radiation therapies or immuno-therapies; herbal 
medication; supportive care; and trials on non-human subjects.  Combination therapies 
are excluded because it is very difficult to determine how successful a clinical trial is 
when a compound is tested in conjunction with another given that it is hard to determine 
the baseline response rate of the other compound.  It also makes sense to exclude agents 
targeting pediatric cancers because the approval process for these drugs is quite different.  
Agents previously reviewed by the FDA add to the complexity of the data collection and 
therefore are excluded.  The other trials are excluded because they are not drugs per se.  
More details about the sample can be found in Roberts et. al. (2004). 
Table 1 provides information on the annual number of abstracts describing Phase 
I oncology trials in the database and lists the annual number of abstracts excluded for 
each reason. The main reason for exclusion is that the trial is a combination therapy.  
There are a total of 2,798 Phase I abstracts identified, but only 1,180 abstracts describe 
agents that meet the criteria.  These 1,180 abstracts describe 377 drug agents.
4  There are 
more abstracts than agents both because there are multiple abstracts published to describe 
a single trial, and because there are multiple Phase I trials on a single drug agent.  Not 
surprisingly, there is a general increase over time in the number of abstracts and agents 
meeting the selection criteria.  
The  identity  of  the  organization  sponsoring  the  trial  was  collected  from  two 
commercial  databases:  Thomson’s  Investigational  Drug  Database  (IDdb)  and  PJB 
Publications’  PharmaProjects.  The  sponsors  are  a  combination  of  public  companies 
(62.3%),  private  companies  (27.6%),  universities  and  government  agencies  (10.1%).  
                                                 
4 There are 351 unique drug agents in the sample, but there are 26 instances where a particular agent is 
being developed by two different organizations for different indications.   12 
58.9% of the Phase I trials are conducted by firms with headquarters in the United States.  
Many  of  the  foreign  companies  in  our  sample,  such  as  Novartis  and  Elan 
Pharmaceuticals,  are  listed  on  U.S.  stock  exchanges  and  have  significant  research 
operations in the U.S.  If the drug is being developed as part of an alliance between two 
organizations, we follow PharmaProjects in only counting the sponsor that developed the 
agent and is sponsoring the trial.  There are several cases in which there are equal co-
sponsors of the trials and we drop these from the sample.  We have 175 unique sponsors 
in the sample.   
  Our analysis centers on the 235 Phase I trials undertaken by the public firms in 
our database.  We exclude the 65 drug candidates sponsored by private firms at this point 
because it is difficult to get balance sheet data on these firms, and because these firms 
raise issues, such as the role of venture capital, that are beyond the scope of this paper.    
We use Thomson Financial’s Thomson Research (formerly Global Access) to find the 
tickers of the public companies, their IPO dates and financial details of the IPO. We 
merge it with Standard & Poor' s Compustat, Compustat Canada, and Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial in order to get financial data about the public companies in our 
sample. For comparability, all the financial numbers are converted to U.S. Dollars and 
then adjusted to U.S. Dollars for the year 2000.   
The  PharmaProjects  database  also  track  compounds  through  their  stages  of 
development, from as early as pre-clinical laboratory studies to FDA approval. Thus, we 
were able to reconstruct the timeline of development including follow-on clinical trials in 
Phase II and Phase III.  We also collected information from this database on the kinds of   13 
cancer the trials were targeting,
5 the market size of the indication being targeted, and the 
pharmacological properties of the drug candidate.  The last of these describes a drug’s 
mechanism of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect, i.e. it 
identifies the biological agent or process the drug stimulates or inhibits.  This information 
will be useful to us in constructing measures of the novelty of a particular drug candidate. 
 
3.2 Information on Clinical Trials 
Our study focuses on four aspects of clinical development: the decision of the 
company to take the project forward from Phase I to Phase II; the clinical outcome of the 
Phase II study;   the decision to move from Phase II to Phase III; and ultimate FDA 
approval.  Table 2 provides information on the time between the initiation of the first 
Phase I trial and the initiation of the first Phase II trial, as well as the time between Phase 
II and Phase III trials.  Panel A indicates that the average time between Phase I and Phase 
II trials is 25.3 months.   Panel B shows that 65% of the Phase 1 trials move forward 
within two years and 80% do so within three years (Table 3, Panel B).
6  This is about 
twice as long as the time between initiation of Phase I and Phase II trials reported in 
DiMasi et. al. (2003).   
The mean time between initiation of the first Phase II trial and first Phase III trial 
is 27.1 months (Table 2, Panel A), with almost 60% moving forward within two years 
and 76% moving forward within three years (Table 2, Panel B).  The mean length 
between trials is comparable to numbers reported in the DiMasi study.   
                                                 
5 Note that Phase I oncology trials do not typically target a specific cancer while Phase II trials do.  
6 Based on this distribution, in some of our regression analyses we will look at the decision to move to 
Phase II within two years following the first announcement of Phase I.   
   14 
Of course, not all trials move forward to the next phase.  As Table 2, Panel C 
shows, 67% move forward from Phase I to Phase II as compared to 71% in the DiMasi 
study.  Note however that our sample is right censored; for Phase I trials begun later in 
the sample, there are only a few years during which the trial could have moved forward. 
Given that the lion’s share of Phase I trials move forward within three years, this right 
censuring of Phase II trials is not a major issue.  Table 2, Panel C also shows that 32% of 
the trials that make it to Phase II, later move forward to Phase III.  DiMasi’s study finds 
that 44% of the Phase II trials move forward to Phase III.  Here the right censuring might 
be more of an issue, because the time between Phase I and Phase III is four to five years.
7   
Beginning in Phase II, drug candidates are tested for particular indications, e.g., 
lung cancer, liver cancer, or breast cancer.  As Table 3, Panel A shows, 54% of the agents 
are tested for two or more cancers, with the mean being 2.7 indications.  In a majority of 
cases (57%), sponsors only have one agent in clinical trials in our sample, while two 
sponsors (Bristol Myers Squibb and Novartis) show up sixteen times.  The average is 2.1 
agents. 
 
3.3 Information on Companies 
Table 4 presents summary data (deflated to the year 2000) on the public 
companies sponsoring the trials in the sample. On average, the public companies are very 
large, with mean revenues of over $8 billion, mean assets of almost $11 billion, mean 
cash of close to $2 billion and mean R&D of about $1 billion.  The average market 
                                                 
7As our study will show, the Phase II to Phase III probabilities depend on the type of firm that is 
undertaking the trial and the DiMasi study is restricted to mature biopharmaceutical firms.  Also, the 
transition probabilities and mean time between trials are very similar for public firms and the rest of the 
sample.     15 
capitalization is over $38 billion and mean Q is 10.2.  On average, the firms were public 
for almost 26 years before embarking on the Phase I trials in our sample.  
  These averages mask considerable heterogeneity in the data.     The 25
th percentile 
firm has revenues of only $9.5 million, cash of $41.4 million, R&D of $21.0 million and 
a market capitalization of $202.7 million.  As we have suggested, there are really two 
types of firms that are undertaking clinical trials in oncology.  One type is the mature 
biopharmaceutical firm with sizable revenues, some (or many) drugs already on the 
market, and a portfolio of drug candidates in clinical trials or in the laboratory.  The other 
type of firm is an early stage biopharmaceutical, with no drugs on the market and a 
limited portfolio of drug candidates (often only one) in clinical trials or in the laboratory.  
  Because we do not have direct information on drug revenues by company, our 
proxy for whether a firm is early stage is whether the firm has revenues less than $30 
million deflated to 2000.  The revenues of these firms typically come from two sources: 
milestone payments from other firms as part of alliances and contract R&D work.  There 
are a few firms with revenues greater than $30 million, but less than $250 million.  We 
found that these firms all had drugs that were on the market or about to be on the market, 
so we consider them mature firms.   
  Panels B and C of Table 4 break out the sample into mature and early stage firms.  
Fifty-nine percent of the Phase I trials are done by mature firms, and the remainder are 
done by early stage firms. Not surprisingly, the differences between these firms are very 
large in terms of cash, R&D, and market capitalization.  
 
   16 
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we compare the decisions of early stage and mature firms to move 
forward in the clinical trials process.   
A.  Basic Analysis 
A. 1 Phase I to Phase II Transition Probabilities. We start by estimating probit 
models of the decision to go from Phase I to Phase II within two years.  We use a two-
year cutoff on the Phase II decision for two reasons. One reason is that, without a cutoff, 
Phase I trials that were begun in the early part of the sample would be more likely to be 
taken forward.  If there is an over-representation of one type of firm in the early period, 
this would bias our findings.  The second reason to use a time cutoff is to measure the 
aggressiveness with which firms move forward in the clinical trials process.  Note that 
69% of the agents that are taken forward to Phase II by the public companies are taken 
forward within two years.  To avoid making seemingly arbitrary cutoffs, we will also 
estimate Cox proportional hazard models.  This allows us to estimate the probability per 
year that a firm takes a trial forward.  
The key regressor in our model is, Early Stage, a dummy variable for whether the 
drug’s sponsor is an early stage biopharmaceutical firm. We also include a set of 
controls:  information on the clinical outcome at Phase I --- response rate and toxicity; 
whether the drug is a biologic agent (as opposed to a chemical compound); whether the 
drug was sponsored at one point by the National Institutes of Health or any of its affiliate 
organizations; the novelty of the agent under investigation; and the potential market size 
of the drug.     17 
Before getting to the regressions it is worth simply comparing the Phase II 
transition probabilities of the early stage and mature firms.  Of the 139 agents sponsored 
by mature firms, 63 (45.3%) move from Phase I to Phase II within two years.  By 
contrast, early stage firms are more prone to advance to Phase II; of the 96 agents 
sponsored by early stage firms, 59 (61.4%) move forward to Phase II within two years.  
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.   
The probit regressions in Table 5 show that this finding is robust to the inclusion 
of various controls.  The reported numbers are the marginal effects of a unit increase in 
the regressors, not coefficient estimates from the regression.  The first column just 
replicates the finding discussed above without the controls: the estimated marginal effect 
of the Early Stage dummy is 0.161, indicating that early stage firms are 16.1% more 
likely than mature firms to move forward to Phase II.  
The second column of Table 5 adds Phase I clinical data to the regression, but the  
Early Stage estimate is unaffected.  An increase in the tumor response rate at Phase I 
from zero to 10% is predicted to increase the Phase II transition probability by 9.7%. This 
estimate is, however, statistically insignificant.  This is true of the other regressors as 
well. Whether the drug candidate is a biologic agent or a chemical compound has a small, 
statistically insignificant effect.  Prior NIH-sponsorship of research on the drug candidate 
appears to have a large estimated effect on the probability of moving forward, but here 
too the estimate is statistically insignificant. 
These results are consistent with the view that early stage companies are more 
aggressive in bringing drug candidates into Phase II trials because they derive private 
benefits from doing so and they, unlike mature firms, do not have a portfolio of other   18 
drug candidates to advance in clinical trials.  An alternative explanation, however, is that 
early stage are attempting to develop drug candidates that would have higher payoffs if 
they succeed (a higher X in our model). In this case, they would use a lower breakeven 
success probability (p2) in deciding whether to advance to Phase II.  For example, early 
stage companies might be targeting particular cancers with a large market size where 
there are few other approved therapies.  It is also possible that the drug candidates of 
early stage firms are more scientifically innovative and therefore would have a higher 
payoff if they were to succeed.    
Column 3 of Table 5 reports results that address these possibilities by adding two 
controls to the regression.  The first control is a set of two market size dummies that 
come from estimates in the PharmaProjects database.  The first dummy is for whether 
the market size is between $500 million and $2 billion, and the second dummy is for 
whether the market size is greater than $2 billion.  The excluded dummy is for whether 
the market size is less than $500 million.  Although the estimated effects of these 
dummies are positive, they are not statistically significant.  Given that an overwhelming 
majority of the drug candidates target a market size in the $500 million to $2 billion 
range, it is not a surprising finding.  In addition, as noted earlier, most Phase I cancer 
trials target cancer in general, not specific cancers, so it is unlikely that there would be 
much variation in market size at the Phase I stage. 
The last regression in Table 5 also includes a measure of the drug candidate’s 
novelty.  Novelty is calculated in the following way.  As noted in Section 3, 
PharmaProjects contains a pharmacological description of each drug candidate.  Thus, 
for each pharmacological description we rank drug candidates chronologically, with the   19 
nth drug candidate chronologically within a certain category getting the rank of n. A drug 
candidate with a higher n is considered less novel.  For example, in 1989, Schering-
Plough was the first to conduct a clinical trial using a DNA antagonist (Tomozolomide).  
In 2000, Access Pharma also began clinical trials of a DNA antagonist, but it was the 
twentieth such clinical trial, making it less novel by our measure.  The average n in our 
sample of mature firms is 24.6, while the average for early stage firms is 22.0 a 
statistically insignificant difference.    
In the regression in column 3 of Table 5, we include the natural log of 1/n as our 
measure of novelty.  There is a positive, statistically significant relationship between 
novelty and the probability of moving from Phase I to Phase II.  Nevertheless, there is no 
appreciable effect of including the novelty measure on the Early Stage dummy.  This is 
not surprising in light of the fact that there is little difference in the novelty of the drug 
candidates developed by early stage and mature firms.   
  A. 2. Performance of Phase II Trials.  Prediction 2 suggests that early stage firms 
will be less successful than mature firms in Phase II trials.  To test this prediction we 
collected data on the clinical outcomes of the Phase II trials from abstracts published in 
Papers/Proceeding the American Society of Clinical Oncology, the same source we used 
for information on the Phase I trials.  We record the percentage of patients in a trial that 
exhibit some tumor shrinkage.  This is a key endpoint used by the industry to measure the 
success of Phase II oncology trials. We have clinical data on a total of 201 Phase II trials. 
These include multiple trials conducted on a single agent for different indications.  We 
are unable to find clinical information on a number of the trials that we know were   20 
initiated either because the study was not completed or because the study abstract was 
never published in Papers/Proceedings.  
  Table 6 presents summary information on the average tumor response rate 
reported in the Phase II trials undertaken by the firms in our sample.  On average, the 
tumors of 9.5% of trial participants showed some response.  Consistent with our 
prediction, the table also shows that the response rate was nearly twice as high for the 
mature firms (12.0%) as for the early stage firms (6.1%).  The table also shows the 
distribution of clinical trials across twelve different cancer types, with the most common 
being respiratory, digestive, breast, and genital type cancers.  There is no systematic 
difference between mature and early stage firms in the distribution of trials across these 
cancer types. The table also shows the percentage of patients in the trials who received 
prior treatments for cancer.  Again there is no difference between early stage and mature 
firms.  
  Table 7 compares the Phase II response rates of early stage and mature firms in a 
regression framework.  The first column of the table restricts attention to the 108 Phase II 
trials begun within two years of the initiation of the Phase I trial for which we also have 
Phase II clinical data.  This column includes no controls and simply documents that the 
average response rate in these trials is 4.4% lower for early stage firms than for mature 
firms.  The difference is not statistically significant.  Including the controls in the 
regression in the second column amplifies the difference; on average, early stage firms 
have a 5.9% lower response rate than mature firms.  Evaluated at the means of the 
controls, this regression model predicts that the response rate of patients enrolled in Phase 
II trials of mature firms will be twice as likely to exhibit some tumor shrinkage as   21 
patients in Phase II trials of early stage firms.  The third column of Table 7 shows that the 
estimated effect is similar if we include all Phase II trials, not just those begun within two 
years of Phase I initiation.   
   A. 3  Phase II to Phase III Transition Probabilities.  Another measure of whether 
Phase II trials are successful is whether firms proceed to Phase III trials. Before 
discussing the regressions, it is useful to compare the mean transition rates for the two 
sets of firms.  Of the 63 drug candidates brought to Phase II by mature firms within two 
years, 22 (34.9%) are later brought to Phase III within three years.  By contrast, only 8 
(13.6%) of the 59 drug candidates brought to Phase II trials within two years by early 
stage firms are eventually brought to Phase III trials within three years.  This 21.3% 
differential is highly statistically significant. 
Table 8 presents the regression analysis.  The first column simply replicates the 
comparison that we just presented.  The other columns add the standard controls, but 
none is statistically significant and they do not affect the estimated effect of the Early 
Stage dummy.    
  A.4. Current Status of the Drugs.  Yet another measure of success is whether the 
drug candidate is ultimately approved by the FDA.  In Table 10, we present the current 
status of the drugs. Panel A shows that 15% of the drugs of mature companies have been 
approved while only 6% of the drugs of early stage companies have been approved. In 
Panel B, we restrict the comparison to those drugs that had moved to Phase II in 2 years 
or less. The differences are amplified for this sub-sample.  For the early stage firms, only 
8.5% of the drug candidates were approved by the FDA, whereas for the mature firms, 
28.6% were approved.  This fact also supports the view that early stage firms are less   22 
selective in the drug candidates they bring forward to Phase II.  One caveat to keep in 
mind, however, is that given the time is takes to get FDA approval, drugs that enter our 
sample relatively late will have a lower probability of getting approved.  This will only 
explain the difference between early stage and mature firms if mature firms begin their 
trials earlier in the sample, but there is no evidence of that. 
  A.5. Sales Revenue.  As noted earlier, it is possible that early stage firms are more 
likely to advance from Phase I to Phase II not because of agency problems, but because 
they have more novel therapeutic approaches and they are targeting larger markets.  As 
we showed, this is not the case. Moreover, including measures of novelty and market size 
has no meaningful effect on the estimates.   
Another way to see whether early stage firms are going after higher payoff 
projects is to look at their payoffs when they actually succeed in launching a drug.  There 
are 29 product launches in our sample, only seven of which are by early stage firms.  We 
were able to collect information on product sales in the first three years after the product 
launch for all seven launches by early stage firms and 17 of the 22 product launches by 
mature firms.  The differences are quite striking, but are the opposite of what one would 
expect if early stage firms are taking bigger risks. As can be seen from Table 10, in each 
of the three years, the mature firms sell considerably more than the early stage firms. In 
the first year after launch, the sales of products launched by early stage firms are $12.7 
million on average as compared to $99.7 million for mature firms. In the second year, the 
average is $61.3 million for early stage firms as compared to $141.3 million for mature 
firms.  In the third year, early stage firms sell $108.4 million, whereas mature firms sell 
$204.3 million on average.     23 
In five instances, we were unable to find information on the sales of products by 
mature firms.  One might be concerned that when sales are very low for such firms, this 
information is less likely to be disclosed.  Even so, if one assumes that sales for these 
products are zero, the average sales of products launched by mature firms are still greater 
that those of early stage firms in each of the three years following product launch. 
A. 6.  Alliances.  Many of the early stage companies in the sample develop their 
drug candidates as part of an alliance with a large pharmaceutical company.  In these 
alliances a pharmaceutical firm typically makes payments to an early stage firm to fund 
clinical development in exchange for the right to license and sell the drug if it is 
approved.  In our sample, 62.5% of the drug candidates of early stage companies have 
some kind of an alliance at the time of the Phase I trial.  One might expect that the 
alliance limits the ability of an early stage company to take compounds forward from 
Phase I to Phase II if they have little chance of succeeding.  This does not appear to be 
the case in our sample; there is very little difference in the transition probabilities of drug 
candidates being developed in alliances and those being developed solely by an early 
stage firm.  This finding is consistent with Guedj (2004) who shows that mature 
pharmaceutical firms are more likely to advance Phase I clinical trials into Phase II when 
they are developing a drug in an alliance with an early stage firm than when they are 
developing a drug on their own.  
 
B.  The Effect of Financial Resources on the Clinical Trials of Early Stage Firms 
  The previous sub-section presents evidence that early stage firms are more prone 
than mature firms to move forward from Phase I to Phase II, to have worse clinical   24 
results in their Phase II trials (in the form of lower response rates), and to be less likely to 
move from Phase II to Phase III.  Our model suggests that managers of early-stage firms 
are reluctant to pull the plug in early clinical trials even if doing so would be value 
maximizing. However, as Prediction 3 indicates, to the extent that the firm has fewer  
financial resources, this should put a limit on the ability of management to over-invest in 
Phase II trials and should lead to greater success at Phase II (Prediction 4). 
To test these predictions, we need a measure of financial resources.  We define a 
firm with limited financial resources as one with cash of less than $30 million (deflated to 
2000). Our assumption is that all mature firms have ample financial resources given that 
biopharmaceutical firms generate very large cash flows (even after their considerable 
R&D expenses).  Thus, the test really hinges on comparing the Phase I and Phase II 
decisions and outcomes of early stage firms based on their cash holdings.  
  A simple comparison of transition probabilities for early stage firms tells the basic 
story.  Of the 96 Phase I trials conducted by early stage firms, 55 are conducted by firms 
with low cash reserves, and the remaining 41 are conducted by firms with relatively large 
cash reserves. Out of the 55 Phase I trials conducted by the low-cash firms, 28 (50.9%) 
proceed to Phase II, whereas 31 (75.6%) out of the 41 Phase I trials conducted by the 
high-cash firms proceed to Phase II.  Thus, the Phase II transition probability for the low-
cash early-stage firms is only slightly higher than that of mature firms (45.3%), whereas 
the transition probability of the high-cash firms is significantly higher than those of the 
constrained early stage firms and the mature firms.   This result is reflected in the probit 
regressions in Table 11.  As before, none of the controls is statistically significant nor do 
they impact the estimated effects of Early Stage dummies.   25 
  Table 12 shows that the average response rate of patients in Phase II trials 
conducted by high cash early stage firms is particularly low.  In the full model with 
controls, the response rate of these firms is 9.3% below that of mature firms; the response 
rate of early stage low cash firms is 4.7% below that of mature firms. This basic pattern is 
robust to including all Phase II trials, not just those begun within two years of Phase I 
initiations. The estimated effects for the early stage high-cash firms are statistically 
significant. Evaluated at the means of the controls, they predict that patients enrolled in 
trials conducted by mature firms will be more than three times as likely to show some 
tumor shrinkage as patients enrolled in a study conducted by high-cash early stage firms.  
  The findings on the Phase II to Phase III transition are also very striking.  Of the 
28 Phase II trials conducted by low-cash firms, 7 (25.0%) went on to Phase III; however, 
only 1 (3.2%) out of the 31 Phase II trials conducted by high-cash firms went to Phase 
III.  The Phase II success rate of the high-cash firms is obviously much lower than that of 
the low-cash firms and the mature firms (34.9%).  The success rate of the early stage 
constrained firms is lower than that of the mature firms, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Again, these finding are reflected in the probit regressions, which 
are presented in Table 13. 
 
4.3 Estimating Proportional Hazard Models   
As discussed above, our data is right censored by which we mean that some drugs 
may eventually advance to Phase II or Phase III, but we do not yet observe that event. A 
Phase I trial begun in 2002 that has not yet transitioned to Phase II is not the same as a 
Phase I trial begun in 1994 that has not transitioned to Phase II.  We dealt with this   26 
problem by counting as a Phase I to Phase II transition only those that occurred within 
two years.  Likewise for Phase III transitions, we only counted those that occurred within 
three years of initiating Phase II.  This approach has the added benefit of measuring how 
successful  each  phase  was  on  the  theory  that  trials  that  transition  more  quickly  are 
probably more highly valued by their sponsors.   
Another  approach  to  dealing  with  right  censoring  is  to  use  survival  analysis. 
Survival analysis examines and models the time it takes for an event to occur.  Here we 
use  the  Cox  proportional  hazard  model,  following  the  specification  outlined  in  Cox 
(1975). A drug is assumed to have a certain probability of succeeding in each period. 
Success is defined as the event of moving from Phase I to Phase II. The instantaneous 
probability of success at any given time t is called the hazard rate, h(t), defined as: 
t times for success of obability
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However, the model assumes no restriction on the function h0(t).  
We  report  the  results  of  our  survival  analysis  in  Table  14.  We  use  the  same 
controls as in the previous section.  The numbers reported are hazard ratios.  In column 1, 
the estimated effect of being an early stage company is large and statistically significant; 
it indicates that early stage firms have a 58% higher hazard of moving to Phase II than do 
mature  firms.    The  second  column  breaks  out  high-cash  and  low-cash  firms.    Not 
surprisingly, the high-cash firms have an even higher hazard ratio; they are 123% more   27 
likely than mature firms to transition from Phase I to Phase II.  The increased hazard for 
the low-cash firms is 24%%, but it is statistically insignificant.   
Columns 3 and 4 describe a similar analysis, although in this case we measure the 
hazard  of  moving  from  Phase  II  to  Phase  III.  The  results  on  Phase  II  to  Phase  III 
transitions are similar to those discussed earlier. The hazard ratio for the early stage firms 
is 0.39, indicating that their hazard of progressing from Phase II to Phase III is less than 
half that of mature firms. This estimate is statistically significant.  The effects for the 
early stage high-cash firms and early stage low-cash firms are similar. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We show that early stage biopharmaceutical firms are more aggressive than 
mature biopharmaceutical firms in bringing their drug candidates forward from Phase I to 
Phase II clinical trials.  However, the drug candidates they bring to Phase II appear to be 
less promising; conditional on making it to Phase II, patients in trials conducted by early 
stage firms are much less likely to show some tumor shrinkage and these drug candidates 
are much less likely to advance to Phase III.  These findings are driven to a great extent 
by the sub-sample of early stage firms with large cash reserves.   
Our findings point to an agency problem between shareholders and managers of 
single-product early stage firms who are reluctant to pull the plug on their only viable 
drug candidates.  We argue that the interests of managers of mature firms are more 
aligned with their shareholders.  With their large portfolio of drug candidates, managers 
of these firms are more willing to pull the plug on unpromising drug candidates because   28 
they have other ones they can bring to clinical trials.  The findings appear to be consistent 
with the benefits of internal capital markets identified by Stein (1997). 
There are a number of ways in which we hope to build on this research.  First, it is 
worth investigating why there are big differences in the behavior of early stage firms.  
Part of the answer may lie in understanding why some firms have more cash on hand than 
others.  One possibility is that firms are more prone to raise equity capital during periods 
when biopharmaceutical firms are more highly valued.  These funds give managers 
considerable freedom in the conduct of clinical trials.  By contrast, when market 
valuations in this sector are low, firms tend to rely more heavily on alliances in which 
control over clinical trials is shared by the firm and its alliance partner (Lerner, Shane and 
Tsai, 2003). Thus, understanding the role of the equity markets and alliances in the 
clinical trials process is very high on our research agenda.
8  
Second, we have ignored differences that may exist in the drug development 
strategies of mature firms.  Although our evidence suggests that having more drugs in the 
pipeline makes firms more selective on average and results in a higher Phase II success 
rate, the composition of this pipeline and the organizational structure of these firms could 
have an effect on their decision making.  For example, if cancer drugs are a large part of a 
company’s overall portfolio, is it more or less selective in its decision to move forward to 
Phase II?  Or if the drug candidate was acquired in a merger, how does it affect the 
transition probability? 
Finally, it would be worth examining the 65 trials that are conducted by the 
private firms in our sample.  We suspect that many of these firms are still being funded 
                                                 
8 Guedj (2004) is a first step in understanding the role of alliances in clinical trials.  His research suggests 
that even with alliances early stage firms are more prone to take drugs forward from Phase I to Phase II and 
the fail in Phase II trials.      29 
by venture capitalists.  In theory, it is not clear whether the existence of venture capital 
funding exacerbates or mitigates the agency problem in drug development.  On the one 
hand, venture capitalists fund companies in stages, disbursing funds only when they are 
needed.  To the extent that venture capitalists are able to assess the prospects of the drug, 
they would not choose to fund drugs with low expected payoffs. On the other hand, the 
goal of venture capitalists may not be to maximize the value of the portfolio company, 
but rather the shorter-run probability that the firm can be taken public.  Gompers (1996) 
has shown that this incentive is particularly strong among young venture capital funds 
with limited track records since they need to convince potential limited partners that they 
have made good portfolio investments.  Thus, if a company is better able to go public if it 
has later stage clinical trials, venture capitalists may encourage early stage firms to move 
clinical trials forward even if the expected payoffs are low.   
Our findings raise broader issues about the creation and survival of 
biopharmaceutical startups. If the R&D process in early stage firms is inefficient, as we 
suggest, then it is natural to ask why such firms would ever be created and how they 
could survive in parallel with mature biopharmaceutical firms that seem not to be plagued 
by these inefficiencies.   Why wouldn’t the founders of biopharmaceutical firms --- most 
of whom are academic scientists --- sell their ideas to mature firms with diverse product 
portfolios who can manage clinical development more efficiently?   It is important to note 
that many of them do in fact sell their scientific discoveries to established firms.  
However, many do not because in doing so they give up control of follow-on scientific 
and clinical advances that emerge in the process of development.  While a scientist could, 
in principle, be compensated for these follow-on discoveries, given the difficulty of   30 
writing complete contracts, it is unlikely that he would be compensated as much as if he 
retained control and developed the idea in his own firm.  Thus, one potential benefit of 
founding a firm to commercialize a scientific discovery is that it provides high-powered 
incentives for discovery.   The potential cost --- documented in our research --- is that it 
provides high-powered incentives to advance drugs through clinical trials even though it 
may be inefficient to do so.  This suggests that there are costs and benefits of conducting 
scientific discovery within different organizational forms.  A fuller understanding of 
these costs and benefits should be the goal of future research.     31 
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Table 1 




The initial sample summarized in this table is from Roberts et. al. (2004).  It is constructed by searching for Phase 
I clinical trials listed in annual publications of Papers/Proceedings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology 
from  1990-2002.    For  each  year,  the  table  lists  the  number  of  abstracts  identified,  the  number  of  abstracts 
eliminated from the sample for each of the main reasons described in the text, the number of abstracts meeting the 







Abstracts  Radiation 
Chemo- 













1990  28  0  0  0  14  14  12 
1991  142  3  4  4  62  73  20 
1992  172  6  9  6  87  71  21 
1993  196  13  7  7  111  76  27 
1994  240  11  16  13  123  89  23 
1995  162  14  8  4  90  67  26 
1996  162  10  8  5  92  59  27 
1997  263  25  19  9  112  113  39 
1998  296  22  8  9  159  115  52 
1999  282  25  12  5  160  112  34 
2000  261  20  8  7  141  109  45 
2001  282  19  2  4  120  149  29 
2002  312  27  8  7  156  133  22 
Total  2798  195  109  80  1427  1180  377 
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Table 2 
Time between Clinical Trials 
 
This table reports data on the  time that elapsed between the initiation of the first Phase I clinical trial and 
the initiation of the first Phase II clinical trial for a particular agent, as well as information on the time 
elapsed between Phase II and Phase III.   
 
Panel A: Time Distribution between Clinical Phases (in months) 
 
  Mean  Median  25%  75%  St. Dev. 
Phase I to Phase II  22.32  18  11  27  16.97 





Panel B: Time between Clinical Phases 
 
Phase I to Phase II  Phase II to Phase III 
Years  Frequency  Percentage  Years  Frequency  Percentage 
0-1  59  36.4%  0-1  10  20.0% 
1-2  53  32.7%  1-2  20  40.0% 
2-3  24  14.8%  2-3  8  16.0% 
3-4  12  7.4%  3-4  4  8.0% 
4-5  8  4.9%  4-5  3  6.0% 
5-6  4  2.5%  5-6  3  6.0% 
6-7  0  0.0%  6-7  1  2.0% 
7-8  1  0.6%  7-8  0  0.0% 
8-9  1  0.6%  8-9  0  0.0% 
9-10  0  0.0%  9-10  0  0.0% 
10-11  0  0.0%  10-11  1  2.0% 










years  Ever 
From Phase I to Phase II  48%  58%  69% 
From Phase II to Phase III  19%  24%  31% 
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Table 3 
Agents per Company and Indications per Agent 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the number of agents developed by companies and the number of 
indications (different types of cancer) investigated for each drug developed.  
 
Panel A: Number of Agents per Sponsor 
 
Number of 
Agents  Frequency  Percentage 
1  103  57% 
2  43  24% 
3  13  7% 
4  7  4% 
5  4  2% 
6  5  3% 
7  0  0% 
8  2  1% 
9  0  0% 
10  1  1% 
11  0  0% 
12  0  0% 
13  1  1% 
14  0  0% 
15  0  0% 
16  2  1% 
Total  181   
 
Panel B: Number of Phase II Indications per Agent 
 
Number of Indications  Frequency  Percentage 
1  83  46% 
2  31  17% 
3  22  12% 
4  14  8% 
5  9  5% 
6  9  5% 
7  5  3% 
8  3  2% 
9  3  2% 
14  1  1% 
Total  180   
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Table 4  
Summary Statistics on Sample Companies 
 
This table report summary statistics on the public companies in our sample. We use Standard & Poor' s Compustat, 
Compustat Canada, and Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial. For comparability, all the financial numbers are 
converted to million U.S. Dollars deflated to the year 2000.  All the figures are for the year in which each drug went 
to Phase I clinical trials. Revenues, Assets, Cash, R&D, and Book Value are from the respective items in Compustat. 
Market Cap is the number of outstanding shares at the end of the calendar year multiplied by the share price at the 
end of the calendar year. Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of assets less the 
book value of equity to the book value of assets. Panel A reports the full sample; Panel B reports the sub-sample of 
mature firms; and Panel C reports the complimentary sub-sample of early-stage firms. We define an early stage firm 
as one with revenues less than or equal to $30 million deflated to the year 2000. 
 





Revenues  Assets  Cash  R&D  Market 
Cap 
Book 
Value  Q 
Mean  25.8  8,116.9  10,964.5  1,947.0  1,003.9  38,635.2  5,282.3  10.2 
Median  21.7  5,761.7  4,544.9  452.1  394.5  10,310.8  1,563.4  7.4 
St. Dev.  22.7  9,766.1  13,531.1  3,257.8  1,228.8  54,844.1  7,001.9  10.5 
1%  0.2  0.0  4.0  2.8  2.7  14.4  1.6  1.3 
25%  4.2  9.5  57.5  41.4  21.0  202.7  45.7  4.4 
75%  40.7  14,080.2  17,578.0  2,469.1  1,798.9  60,107.2  8,678.8  12.7 
99%  73.4  33,822.0  45,561.8  12,959.5  4,879.3  246,316.3  26,140.6  64.4 
 





Revenues  Assets  Cash  R&D  Market 
Cap 
Book 
Value  Q 
Mean  37.4  14,178.9  19,084.5  3,340.1  1,736.8  67,134.8  9,172.7  10.5 
Median  37.9  13,488.5  16,543.5  2,184.0  1,635.0  55,626.0  7,344.0  8.1 
St. Dev.  21.4  8,982.5  12,874.0  3,745.6  1,175.6  57,889.4  7,092.6  7.3 
1%  1.0  89.1  114.5  73.8  15.0  932.6  93.8  2.4 
25%  24.0  7,683.0  9,288.8  775.5  847.9  23,310.1  4,557.5  6.5 
75%  56.3  18,216.0  29,971.0  3,836.8  2,445.9  92,310.5  11,913.0  13.7 
99%  73.5  37,899.1  47,542.3  15,602.2  4,879.3  246,316.3  26,140.6  35.8 
 





Revenues  Assets  Cash  R&D  Market 
Cap 
Book 
Value  Q 
Mean  10.2  10.7  106.3  84.1  23.9  404.0  78.9  9.7 
Median  5.0  7.1  51.1  35.2  18.3  176.4  41.6  5.2 
St. Dev.  12.9  11.6  156.9  142.1  26.3  581.4  120.3  13.8 
1%  0.1  0.0  2.9  0.4  2.5  0.5  0.8  1.3 
25%  1.3  1.8  24.9  17.8  10.4  72.4  18.1  3.0 
75%  12.0  17.5  114.4  82.3  29.9  463.2  86.5  9.2 
99%  42.4  28.1  793.7  788.5  223.5  2,893.8  541.4  74.2 
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Table 5 
 Probit Regressions of the Probability of Moving from Phase I to Phase II   
  
This table reports the result of probit regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm 
progresses to Phase II trials within two years of initiating a Phase I trial and 0 otherwise. The regressors 
include a dummy variable which takes the value one if the company is an early stage company (revenues 
no more than $30 million deflated to the year 2000).  The regressors also include a set of controls for 
clinical results of the Phase I trials, as well as characteristics of the drug in development.  Response Rate I 
is the percentage of patients whose tumor shrank in the Phase II trials. Toxicity is the percentage of patients 
who had a toxic reaction to the drug in the Phase I trials. Biologic is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
drug is a biologic drug, 0  if it is a chemical drug.  NIH Sponsored is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) or any of its affiliate institutes such as the National Cancer Institute 
(NCI) sponsored the drug. The regressions also control for the potential financial profit to be expected from 
the development of the drugs. One of the controls is the PharmaProjects’ estimated market size of the 
targeted indication.  We use two dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is between 
$500 million and $2000 million and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 million. 
Another control measures the novelty of the drugs. We measure this by recording the pharmacological 
description (a drug’s mechanism of action in the body through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and 
ranking the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description 
prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank. 
 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Early Stage (dummy)  0.1613    0.1649    0.1600    0.1655 
  (2.83)    (3.17)    (2.70)    (3.01) 
               
Response Rate I (percentage)      0.9721        1.1972 
      (0.90)        (1.04) 
Toxicity (percentage)      -4.9275        -5.6069 
      (0.57)        (0.59) 
Biologic (dummy)      -0.0274        -0.0668 
      (0.19)        (0.41) 
NIH Sponsored (dummy)      0.1929        0.2638 
      (1.14)        (1.67) 
               
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)          0.2026    0.2005 
          (1.49)    (1.43) 
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)          0.0605    0.0499 
          (0.46)    (0.37) 
Novelty 
 
        0.0896    0.0957 
          (5.54)    (5.45) 
               
Number of Observations  235    235    235    235 
 
Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the 
z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors.  We cluster around the phase I year. 
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Table 6 
 Summary Statistics of Phase II Clinical Data 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the clinical data collected from the Papers/Proceedings of the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) from 1990-2002. If a drug had more than one Phase II trial 
for a particular indication we weight the results by the number of effective patients in each clinical trial. 
There are 11 categories of indications derived from the American Cancer Society. Response Rate is the 
percentage of patients whose tumor shrank in the Phase II trials. Previous Treatments is the number of 
previous treatments the patients in the trial have had prior to joining the trial. 
 




Panel B: Phase II Indications 
 





Bone  1%  1%  0% 
Brain & Nervous systems  3%  3%  3% 
Breast  14%  10%  17% 
Digestive  20%  22%  18% 
Genital  14%  14%  14% 
Head and Neck  3%  3%  3% 
Leukemia  1%  2%  0% 
Lymphoma  6%  7%  5% 
Respiratory  20%  21%  20% 
Skin  7%  8%  6% 
Urinary  10%  7%  12% 
Other  1%  0%  1% 
 
 
Panel C: Trial Patients with Previous Treatments 
 
Previous 





None  25.87%  25.58%  26.09% 
1  21.39%  17.44%  24.35% 
2  9.95%  10.47%  9.57% 
2+  41.29%  46.51%  37.39% 
  
Response Rate  Full Sample  Early Stage Companies  Mature Companies 
Full Sample 
Mean  0.095  0.061  0.120 
Median  0.040  0.030  0.065 
Std  0.133  0.076  0.159 
% Greater  than 0  67%  65%  70%   39 
Table 7 
 Regressions of the Response Rates of Patients in Phase II Clinical Trials  
 
The dependent variable is Response Rate, the percentage of patients in a Phase II trial  whose  tumors 
shrank.  These data are taken from Papers/Proceedings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology 
(ASCO) from 1990-2002. If more than one trial was undertaken for a certain indication, we average them, 
weighting by the number of patients. Because indications have different baseline response rate, we control 
for each indication by including indication dummies based on categories of the American Cancer Society. 
We also control for the number of previous treatments the patients received prior to joining the trial, and for 
the stage of the cancer the patient is in. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the sub-sample of public firms that 
moved to Phase II within 2 years of starting Phase I trials.  Column (3) uses the full sample. In parenthesis 
are the t-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. 
 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Early Stage (dummy)  -0.0442    -0.0589    -0.0646    -0.0615 
  (1.44)    (2.24)    (2.38)    (3.53) 
               
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)          0.0020    0.0502 
          (0.03)    (1.12) 
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)          0.0165    0.0340 
          (0.26)    (0.96) 
Novelty          -0.0107    -0.0103 
          (2.05)    (2.38) 
               
Indication Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
Previous Treatment Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
Disease Stage Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
R
2  0.02    0.29    0.30    0.27 
               
Number of Observations  108    108    108    201 
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Table 8 
 Probit Regressions of the Probability of Moving from Phase II to Phase III for the 
Drugs Candidates that Moved to Phase II  
 
This table reports the result of probit regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm 
progresses to Phase III trials within two years of initiating a Phase II trial and 0 otherwise. The regressors 
include a dummy variable which takes the value one if the company is an early stage company (revenues 
less than $30 million deflated to the year 2000).  The regressors also include a set of controls for the 
characteristics of the drug in development.  One of the controls is the PharmaProjects’ estimated market 
size of the targeted indication.  We use two dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is 
between $500 million and $2000 million and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 
million.  Another  control  measures  the  novelty  of  the  drugs.  We  measure  this  by  recording  the 
pharmacological  description  (a  drug’s  mechanism  of  action  in  the  body,  through  which  it  exerts  its 
therapeutic  effect)  and  ranking  the  drug  by  the  number  of  drugs  developed  for  cancer  with  the  same 
pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank. 
 
 
  (1)    (2)   
Early Stage (dummy)  -0.2136    -0.1931   
  (2.79)    (2.46)   
         
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)      0.2057   
      (0.76)   
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)      0.0276   
      (0.12)   
Novelty      0.0618   
      (2.74)   
         
Number of Observations  122    122   
 
 
Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the 
z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the phase I year.   41 
 
Table 9 
 Current Status of the Drugs 
 
This table reports the current status of the drugs in our sample according to PharmaProjects.  NDR – No 
Development Reported, is the status assigned by The PharmaProjects when there is no information about a 
drug and it seems the drug is not under development anymore (although the company has not officially 
announced that the drug has been discontinued).  Discontinued refers to drugs for which the company has 
announced that it has ceased development.  Pre-Registration refers to drugs for which the company is in 
the process of filing a NDA (New Drug Application) with the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) or has 
announced that it intends to do so . Launched drugs are those drugs that have been approved by the FDA 
and are on the market. Panel A reports the statistics for all the drugs; Panel B reports the statistics for the 
drugs that have moved to Phase II within two years of Phase I initiation. 
 
 
PANEL A: All the drugs  
 
  All  Mature Companies  Early Stage Companies 
Status  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage 
NDR  53  22.55%  38  27.34%  15  15.63% 
Discontinued  31  13.19%  22  15.83%  9  9.38% 
Phase I  25  10.64%  15  10.79%  10  10.42% 
Phase II  67  28.51%  27  19.42%  40  41.67% 
Phase III  27  11.49%  16  11.51%  11  11.46% 
Pre-Registration  5  2.13%  0  0.00%  5  5.21% 
Launched  27  11.49%  21  15.11%  6  6.25% 




PANEL B: Drugs that Moved to Phase II in 2 Years or Less 
 
  All  Mature Companies  Early Stage Companies 
Status  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage 
NDR  18  14.75%  9  14.29%  9  15.25% 
Discontinued  12  9.84%  6  9.52%  6  10.17% 
Phase I  1  0.82%  20  31.75%  1  1.69% 
Phase II  44  36.07%  10  15.87%  24  40.68% 
Phase III  20  16.39%  0  0.00%  10  16.95% 
Pre-Registration  4  3.28%  0  0.00%  4  6.78% 
Launched  23  18.85%  18  28.57%  5  8.47% 
   122    63    59   
   42 
Table 10 
Sales of Approved Drugs  
 
This table reports the sales of the drugs in the sample that were approved. The source of the data is New 
Medicine’s Oncology KnowledgeBASE. All the sales figures are in Millions of US Dollars deflated to year 
2000 values. The numbers are for the first, second, and third year of sales following FDA approval. Out of 
the 29 drugs approved in the sample, this table is based on data on 23 of those drugs, 17 out of the 22 






  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
First Year Sales           
Mature Companies  99.7  62.3  108.9  0.9  441.8 
Early Stage Companies  12.7  6.0  17.1  1.4  56.4 
           
Second Year Sales           
Mature Companies  141.6  98.2  144.7  5.0  590.4 
Early Stage Companies  60.3  15.0  72.9  2.6  176.1 
           
Third Year Sales           
Mature Companies  199.4  145.4  196.0  5.0  718.9 
Early Stage Companies  108.5  20.8  135.6  6.5  339.4 
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Table 11 
 Probit Regressions of the Probability of Moving from Phase I to Phase II 
This table reports the result of probit regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm 
progresses to Phase II trials within two years of initiating a Phase I trial and 0 otherwise. The regressors 
include a dummy variable which takes the value one if the company is an early stage company (revenues 
no more than $30 million deflated to the year 2000) and is financially constrained (cash of less than $30 
million deflated to the year 2000).  We also include a dummy for early stage companies that are not 
financially constrained (those early stage companies with more that $30 million of cash deflated to the year 
2000).   The regressors also include a set of controls for clinical results of the Phase I trials, as well as 
characteristics of the drug in development.  Response Rate I is the percentage of patients whose tumor 
shrank in the Phase II trials. Toxicity is the percentage of patients who had a toxic reaction to the drug in 
the Phase I trials. Biologic is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the drug is a biologic drug, 0  if it is a 
chemical drug.  NIH Sponsored is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
or  any  of  its  affiliate  institutes  such  as  the  National  Cancer  Institute  (NCI)  sponsored  the  drug.  The 
regressions also control for the potential financial profit to be expected from the development of the drugs. 
One of the controls is the PharmaProjects’ estimated market size of the targeted indication.  We use two 
dummy variables, one for whether the estimated market size is between $500 million and $2000 million 
and another for whether the estimated market size exceeds $2000 million. Another control measures the 
novelty of the drugs. We measure this by recording the pharmacological description (a drug’s mechanism 
of action in the body, through which it exerts its therapeutic effect) and ranking the drug by the number of 
drugs developed for cancer with the same pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log 
of the inverse of this rank. 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Early Stage  High Cash Firm (dummy)  0.3000    0.3165    0.2868    0.3029 
  (4.11)    (4.50)    (3.70)    (4.00) 
Early Stage Low Cash Firm (dummy)  0.0557    0.0508    0.06     0.0609 
  (1.15)    (1.21)    (1.07)    (1.10) 
               
Response Rate (percentage)      1.0887        1.2828 
      (1.05)        (1.15) 
Toxicity (percentage)      -7.6176        -7.7579 
      (0.87)        (0.84) 
Biologic (dummy)      -0.0398        -0.0705 
      (0.30)        (0.44) 
NIH Sponsored (dummy)      0.1930        0.2558 
      (1.02)        (1.49) 
               
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)          0.1634    0.1574 
          (1.06)    (0.99) 
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)          0.0072    -0.0071 
          (0.05)    (0.05) 
Novelty          0.0832    0.0881 
          (4.70)    (4.46) 
               
Number of Observations  235    235    235    235 
 
Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the 
z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the Phase I year.   44 
 
Table 12 
 Regressions of the Response Rate of Patients in Phase II Clinical Trials  
The dependent variable is Response Rate, the percentage of patients in a Phase II trial  whose  tumors 
shrank.  These data are taken from Papers/Proceedings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology 
(ASCO) from 1990-2002. If more than one trial was undertaken for a certain indication, we average them, 
weighting by the number of patients. Because indications have different baseline response rate, we control 
for each indication by including indication dummies based on categories of the American Cancer Society. 
We also control for the number of previous treatments the patients received prior to joining the trial, and for 
the stage of the cancer the patient is in. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the sub-sample of public firms that 
moved to Phase II within 2 years of starting Phase I trials.  Column (3) uses the full sample. In parenthesis 
are the t-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. 
 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Early Stage High Cash Firm (dummy)  -0.0551    -0.0889    -0.0934    -0.0609 
  (1.73)    (3.71)    (4.20)    (.48) 
Early Stage Low Cash Firm (dummy)  -0.0364    -0.0397    -0.0466    -0.0147 
  (1.07)    (1.33)    (1.46)    (1.50) 
               
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)          -0.0138    0.0383 
          (0.20)    (0.89) 
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)          0.0000    0.0207 
          (0.00)    (0.59) 
Novelty          -0.0099    -0.0091 
          (2.25)    (2.28) 
               
Indication Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
Previous Treatment Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
Disease Stage Dummies  No    Yes    Yes    Yes 
               
R
2  0.02    0.30    0.31    0.28 
               
Number of Observations  108    108    108    201 
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 Table 13 
 Probit Regressions of the Probability of Moving from Phase II to Phase III 
 
The model estimated is a probit model. The dependent variable is the probability of advancing from phase 
II to phase III in the 3 years following phase II, thus it takes one of two values: 1 if the drug moved to 
phase II and 0 if not. We define an early stage company as one that has revenues (deflated to the year 2000) 
of less than 30$m. We define a financially constrained company as one that has less than 30$m in cash and 
short-term investments (Deflated to the year 2000). We regress this probability on a dummy if the company 
is an early stage company and not financially constrained and on another dummy if it is an early stage 
company that is financially constrained.  Market size – We use 3 dummies whether the potential market 
size is up to 500$m, between 500 and 2000$m and more than 2000$m. Novelty of the drugs – for every 
drug we record its pharmacological description (a drug’s mechanism of action in the body, through which it 
exerts its therapeutic effect) and rank the drug by the number of drugs developed for cancer with the same 
pharmacological description prior to this drug. Novelty is the log of the inverse of this rank. 
 
 
  (1)    (2)   
Early Stage High Cash Firm (dummy)  -0.2974    -0.2903   
  (3.28)    (3.54)   
Early Stage Low Cash Firm (dummy)  -0.0762    (0.05)   
  (1.02)    (0.67)   
         
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)      0.3092   
      (1.14)   
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)      0.0918   
      (0.46)   
Novelty      0.0396   
      (1.66)   
         
Number of Observations  122    122   
 
 
Note: We report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. In parenthesis are the 
z-stats calculated using White (1982) standard errors. We cluster around the Phase I year. 
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Table 14 
 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
We  use  a  Cox  proportional  hazard  model,  following  the  specification  outlined  in  Cox  (1975)  as  a 
methodology  developed  to  analyze  survival  data.  We  do  so  in  order  to  account  for  the  possible  right 
censoring in our data. A drug is assumed to have a certain probability of succeeding in each period. Success 
is defined as the event of moving from phase I to phase II, or the event of moving from phase II to phase 
III. The instantaneous probability of success at any given time t is called the hazard rate, h(t), defined as: 
t success of obability









The  Cox  model  assumes  that  the  hazard  function  has  a  functional  form,  yet  the  model  assumes  no 
restriction on the function. Thus, the dependent variable is time to the defined outcome. 
We use the same variables and controls as described the earlier tables. 
 
 
  Advancing from 
phase I to phase II 
 
  Advancing from 
phase II to phase III 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Early Stage (dummy)  1.5790        0.3946     
  (3.43)        (2.78)     
Early Stage High Cash Firm (dummy)      2.2269        0.3452 
      (4.71)        (2.88) 
Early Stage Low Cash Firm (dummy)      1.2401        0.4487 
      (1.49)        (1.76) 
               
Response Rate (percentage)  0.0865    0.1112         
  (1.48)    (1.34)         
Biologic (dummy)  0.9413    1.0049         
  (0.22)    (0.02)         
NIH Sponsored (dummy)  1.8109    1.8232         
  (1.35)    (1.27)         
               
Market Size - 500-2000$m (dummy)  1.7818    1.5736    1.1652    1.2211 
  (1.61)    (1.21)    (0.22)    (0.29) 
Market Size - 2000+$m (dummy)  1.373    1.1765    0.6158    0.6526 
  (0.97)    (0.47)    (0.61)    (0.54) 
Novelty  1.1246    1.0957    1.2773    1.2881 
  (1.80)    (1.23)    (1.55)    (1.65) 
               
Number of Observations  235    235    162    162 
 
Note: We report the hazard rate for an infinitesimal change in time. In parenthesis are the z-stats calculated 
using White (1982) standard errors.  
 
 
 
 